Vault
Maria's credentials, encrypted on-device.
Each row mirrors the production envelope: an SD-JWT VC, AES-256-GCM -encrypted on the user's device, ciphertext uploaded to 0G Storage. Plaintext claim values stay on the device. The data on this page is fixture metadata — the v2 wire-up replaces it with live ciphertext rows from a real vault. The columns shown are public-by-design even in production: issuer DID, claim names, encryption parameters, storage root hash.
https://compass.0g.ai/vct/help-fdh.v1
HELP for Domestic Workers (St. John's Cathedral office)
did:key:z6MkpT…3JKjk7
Disclosable claims
- is_FDH_in_HK
- has_pending_case
- employment_active
- residency
- Encryption
- AES-256-GCM
- KDF
- PBKDF2-SHA256-600k
- 0G Storage root
- 0x4d188a35…c115b7
- Ciphertext size
- 4.8 KB
- Issued
- 2026-04-12
- Expires
- 2027-04-12
https://compass.0g.ai/vct/bethune-shelter.v1
Bethune House Migrant Women's Refuge
did:key:z6Mkfq…8gZNJh
Disclosable claims
- is_female
- is_FDH_in_HK
- in_distress_marker_from_NGO
- Encryption
- AES-256-GCM
- KDF
- PBKDF2-SHA256-600k
- 0G Storage root
- 0x6c8d2e9f…8c4d1e
- Ciphertext size
- 3.5 KB
- Issued
- 2026-04-18
- Expires
- 2027-04-18
Not yet disclosed
What this listing shows
- • Issuer DID and credential type
- • Names of selectively-disclosable claims
- • Encryption algorithm and KDF parameters
- • 0G Storage root hash of the ciphertext
- • Expiry and most-recent receipt link
What it never shows
- • Plaintext claim values (name, HKID, employer)
- • The decryption key — never on-chain, never on-device-leaving
- • Document images or PDFs
- • Anything a subpoena of this page could exploit